内部控制、僵尸企业与审计特征

以2010—2017年深沪两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本，分析僵尸企业的审计特征并探讨内部控制对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现：相比于非僵尸企业，僵尸企业具有倾向于支付更低的审计费用、更有可能收到非标意见和更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计的特征，同时，僵尸企业内部控制环境更差。进一步研究发现，更高的内部控制质量使得僵尸企业更有可能收到标准无保留的审计意见，但非僵尸企业审计收费更高且更有可能选择高质量审计师。基于产权性质的进一步研究发现：（1）国有僵尸企业支付更低的审计费用，且中央国企支付的审计费用更低；（2）民营僵尸企业更有可能收到非标审计意见；（3）民营僵尸企业和地方国有僵尸企业更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计，且地方国有僵尸企业倾向性更强。从公司治理角度研究僵尸企业的审计特征，为识别僵尸企业提供了经验证据。     

政府审计、内部控制与企业创新

利用手工收集的政府审计公告数据，以2013—2017年的国有上市公司为样本，采用PSM+DID方法检验政府审计对国有上市公司创新活动的影响，并进一步根据内部控制质量和是否存在内部控制缺陷对样本进行分组检验两者之间的关系。研究结果表明：政府审计显著增加了国有上市公司的创新投入和创新产出；在内部控制质量高和不存在内部控制缺陷的样本企业中，政府审计对企业创新活动的促进作用更加显著。     

乡镇政府财务管理的常见问题及完善策略

乡镇政府是我国的基层单位,其开展的工作与我国广大群众的生活息息相关,与人民的利益也是紧密相连的。因此,乡镇政府财务管理工作极其重要,甚至影响着集体的进步与发展。但现实生活中,乡镇政府财务管理存在着很多问题,这些都需要引起我们的重视。论文详细列举乡镇政府财务管理存在的问题,并且就这些问题提出一些相应的、科学的解决方法与措施。     

Parties,divided government,and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence from U.S. states

This paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.     

General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments’ electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the period 1995–2016, I reexamine political cycles in budget composition. The results suggest that, both at the general and central government level, leftwing governments spent more on education and less on public services than rightwing governments. Defense expenditure was somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments and in election years; especially in federal states. Effects of government ideology on the individual expenditure categories are larger at the central than general government level. Scholars need to re-examine results on ideology-induced effects that have been derived from general government data where central government data should have been used.     

Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities

Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. “Civic Lists” in Italy). I exploit the success of “Civic Lists” in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data.     

A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises.     

Optimum government size and economic growth in case of Indian states: Evidence from panel threshold model

This paper investigates the relationship between optimum government size and economic growth using data of Indian states during 1990-91 to 2017–18. Our results derived from panel threshold regression model show a positive and significant impact of government size on economic growth within the estimated thresholds for both aggregate and sub-panels based on income and regions. Once the government size moves above the upper threshold level, then its impact declines and turns to be insignificant. Thus, our findings suggest the policymakers for maintaining the government size within the thresholds limit.     

Foreign direct investment and economic growth: Is more financial development better?

We investigate the extent to which an increase in financial development affects the positive effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth. Although the financial sector is beneficial for economic growth, the effect of further financial development on growth is found to become insignificant. Using a dynamic panel threshold model on 62 middle- and high-income countries spanning the period 1987–2016, we re-examine the possible nonlinearity between finance, foreign direct investment, and growth. Consistent with the “vanishing effect” of financial development, we find significant evidence that foreign direct investment fosters growth in general, but the growth effect of foreign direct investment becomes negligible when the ratio of private sector credit to gross domestic product exceeds 95.6%. This finding is robust to different econometric methods, various subsamples and interaction analyses, and distinct financial development indicators.     

TFP growth in Chinese cities: The role of factor-intensity and industrial agglomeration

This article estimates agglomeration effects via calculating EG (Elilsion & Glaeser) and TFP growth (Total Factor Production) by considering the undesired output of the industrial enterprise database and the entropy weight method. Using panel data of 207 county-level cities in China and 28 two-digit manufacturing industries from 2003 to 2013 based on SIC codes, this paper analyzes the relationship between agglomeration and TFP growth through the smooth transition model under different regions and factor-intensity. The results are as follows. (1) A negative relationship appears in manufacturing productivity. The agglomeration effect changes to the crowded effect. Environmental pollution is also generated by transportation and inadequate pollution treatment technology. (2) The excessive agglomeration phenomenon of developed areas (eastern region) is less than the less developed areas (central and western regions). (3) Resource-intensity industries present two thresholds that indicate complex regional features. For various intensive industries in different regions, the relationship between GML and agglomeration is different. High agglomeration does not always promote TFP growth. (4) At different levels of urban industrial agglomeration, the influences of efficiency change and technical change on GML are different. Overall, moderate agglomeration in all regions helps promote economic development.